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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS,
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.

Case
No. 8980

VETERANS, FOUND,ATION,
a purported non-profit corporation,
Defendant and Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Counsel for appellant shall refer in this brief to the
"Disabled American Veterans, Utah State Department," as
"Plaintiff", to all the defendants as shown in the pleadings
of the lower court, with the exception of Orlo L. Ellison, as
"Defendants"; to the "Veterans Foundation, a non-profit corporation", as "appellant".
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It should be noted that the true and proper name of
Plaintiff is "Department of Utah Disabled American Veterans." That said Departme~t is an unincorporated association chartered by the Disabled American Veterans, a
national organization, and as such is no part of the governing body of the State of Utah, its agencies, or departments.
The members of the Department of Utah DAV, are "all the
active DAV chapters in the State of Utah which have been or
are hereby chartered by the National Department so long
as such chapter remains in good standing . . . .", as shown
in Article IV, Section I, of the Department of Utah, DAV
Constitution. Further, Article VII, Sections, I, 3, and 4,
of said constitution provide for a "State Executive Committee
consisting of the immediate past Department Commander, the
elected Department officers and one executive committeeman elected from each active chapter . . . .", That ... "the
Executive Committee shall have the determination by a
majority vote over all legislative, administrative, and executive matters not otherwise specifically covered by the pro·
visions of this constitution or by action of the state
convention." That ... "a majority of the members of the
Executive Committee shall be necessary to constitute a quorum
in order to perform the functions of their office. Each com·
mittee member present shall be entitled to one vote..."
Appellant is a duly organized and validly existing non·
profit corporation, organized under the laws of the state of
Utah, and Defendants, other than Veterans Foundation, a
non-profit corporation, Tracy Astle, and Orlo L. Ellison,
are, or have been officers and Directors of Appellant Cor·
poration. Tracy Astle is a past State Commander of
Plaintiff. Orlo L. Ellison is a business man who has oprated
successfully a number of salvage stores in other parts of the
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United States. On or about September 9, 1952, · Orlo L.
Ellison entered into an agreement with Plaintiff wherein
Ellison was to operate a salvage and thrift store, to be known
as Veterans Foundation and wherein Plaintiff was to sponsor
contacts and otherwise cooperate, assist, and support said
business, and Plaintiff was to receive therefore 10 per cent
of the gross sales of said business, which, .as a fund raising
project, would go to the purpose of assisting Disabled
American Veterans.
(See Exhibit "A" attached to Plaintiff's Complaint, R-9, 10). It was contemplated by this
agreement that some years in the future this business, if
successful, could be bought out by the Veterans organization,
and in fact about three years later, in February, 1956, this
was consummated. During negotiations for the purchase
of the thrift store, Mr. Ellison took the definite position,
in view of his past experience in these matters, that under
no condition would he risk selling the business directly to
Plaintiff because of the politics that could be involved and
the subsequent risk of failure of the business, but that he
would deal directly with an independent corporation authorized by the Veterans organization in this state that was completely divorced and independent of the politics of said
Plaintiff's organization. (See Page 15, subparagraph ( 4)
of Defendant's Answer, R-76). Consequently, after careful
study and consideration by the State Executive Committee
of Plaintiff organization, a resolution was adopted by said
Executive Committee approving the formation of the nonprofit corporation known as "Veterans Foundation" and its
Articles of Incorporation, and further authorized the assignment of said Plaintiff's interest to Appellant. The said
resolution, as adopted on December 4, 1955, is as follows:
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"The State Executive Meeting of the Department
of Utah Disabled American Veterans hereby assembled in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 4th day of December, 1955, after hearing the report of the State
Commander and his committee in the forming of a
non-profit corporation for the purpose of entering
into a contract with Orlo L. Ellison for the purchase
of the Veterans Foundation known as the Veterans
Thrift Shop and it appearing that the same is for the
best interest of the disabled veterans of Utah.
"We hereby go on record as approving said action
of said committee in forming the non-profit corporation known as the 'Veterans Foundation' and in
order to carry into effect the purpose of said corporation, hereby authorize the State Commander
and Adjutant to execute an assignment to the said
new non-profit corporation, the 'Veterans Foundation,' of the agreement dated the 9th day of September,
1952, between the State Department of Utah, Disabled American Veterans and Orlo L. Ellison which
it is understood shall be cancelled by mutual consent
at the time said Veterans Foundation, a non-profit
corporation, and said Orlo L. Ellison enter into a
sales agreement.
"It is further understood that the said Veterans
Foundation, a non-profit corporation shall be operated principally for and on behalf of the disabled
veterans as more particularly outlined in Article IV
of the Articles of Incorporation of said 'Veterans
Foundation' and that out of the net profits of said
corporation an amount equal to 10 per cent of the
gross sales shall be paid to the Department of Utah
Disabled American Veterans by said Veterans Foun·
dation and as much more as may be possible shall
be used for the objects of said corporation's crea·
tion, all of which is to be consistent with good business
practice.
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"After some discussion on the resolution, and it was
pointed out that Mr. Ellison was on the verge of
breaking his contract with the Department, a motion
was made by Carlson, State Department, that this
resolution he adopted and approved. This motion
was seconded by Gray, State Department, and the
following roll call vote was taken:
For the Adoption
Against
Ford, Sr. Vice Commander
yes
Schmidt, 1st Jr. Vice Commander
no
Dover, 2nd Jr. Vice Commander yes
Carlson, 3rd Jr. Vice Commander yes
Brusatto, Chaplain
abstained
Edwards, Sgt. of Arms
yes
Gray, Jr. Past Commander
yes
Johnson, Chapter No. 1
no
Lutesinger, Chapter No. 2
yes
Chapter No.3
absent
Trunkey, Chapter No. 4
yes
Enger, Chapter No. 6
no
Chapter No. 7
absent
Shockey, Chapter No. 8
yes
Chapter No. 9
absent
Chapter No. 10
absent
Chapter No. 11
absent
There were eight votes for the adoption of the resolution, and three against adoption. The motion carried and the resolution was adopted. (R-93, 94,
95, 96).
Subsequently, about December 15, 1955, the Articles
of Incorporation of Appellant were filed in the office of the
Secretary of State, as shown in (R-16), Exhibit "D" of Plaintiff's Complaint. Then on February 17, 1956, Plaintiff
assigned to Appellant its interest in the agreement with
Ellison. This assignment is shown as Exhibit "E" in Plaintiff's Complaint (R-22), and the purpose of the assignment
is noted as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
"That the said Veterans Foundation is to be an independent non-profit corporation and shall operate the
business which is the subject of said agreement, with
said Orlo L. Ellison, after purchasing the same from
him for and on behalf of disabled veterans, as set out
in the Articles of Incorporation of said Veterans Foundation."
Orlo L. Ellison then sold and assigned his interest
in the business to Appellant under a Bill of Sale and title
retaining note and agreement as shown in Exhibit "F''
of Plaintiff's Complaint (R-24). It is to be noted also that
under said agreement, Paragraph 6, Mr. Ellison has "an
exclusive general management or supervisory contract as to
the entire business," until he is paid out in full.
Plaintiff had received the sum of $56,192.75 up to
March 31, 1958, from the time the store commenced operation in September, 1952, and $29,962.26 of that sum
was received since the corporation was organized.
That thousands of dollars have been paid to Orlo
Ellison on the purchase price of the business and in addition, Appellant has acquired its own building in the heart
of Salt Lake City. That said business has grown and
developed well. Since Appellant corporation was orgai].ized,
and after being passed upon and adopted by Plaintiff and
the State Executive Committee, however, opposition developed on the part of certain individuals within the Veterans
organization against Appellant and its officers and directors. As a result, the national organization was brought into
the picture, a full study made of the Appellant corporation,
and recommendations were made for amending Appellant's
Article of Incorporation as follows:
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"A. The assignment of the interest of the Department of Utah in the contract with Mr. Orlo Ellison for the operation of a salvage business, which
assignment goes to a non-profit corporation called
'The Veterans Foundation' is approved upon condition that the Articles of Incorporation of the Veterans Foundation be amended to provide as follows:

"l. Article IV, Paragraph A, be amended to
provide that the purpose of the Corporation shall be
to operate and conduct a Salavage Business for the
purpose of raising funds for use by the Department
of Utah, Disabled American Veterans.
"2. Article VI expressly provide that no member of the Board of Directors, as such, shall receive
any salary.
3. Article VI be amended to provide that no
persons shall be selected as a member of the Board
of Directors unless his selection is approved by a
majority vote at a DAV Department of Utah convention.
"That any one or more of the members of the
Board of Directors of the corporation may be recalled
and removed by a two-thirds affirmative vote of the
delegates at any State Convention.
"4. That the Articles
upon the dissolution of the
remaining after payment of
delivered to the Department

expressly provide that
Corporation, its assets
its obligations shall be
of Utah, DAV.

"That the Articles further expressly provide that
no Amendment thereto shall be effective until ratified
by a majority vote of the delegates at an Annual Convention of the Department of Utah, DAV."
(The full text of the National Executive Committee's
letter is set out as an attachment to Plaintiff's Answer
to Interrogatories, R-101)
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Subsequently, Appellant prepared and filed Amended
Articles of Incorporation on or about February 21, 1957,
and shown as Exhibit "H" in Plaintiff's Complaint (R-32).
Then on or about September 28, 1957, Amendments to the
Amended Articles of Incorporation were filed (R-39, 41).
That said amendments were drafted and prepared for the
most part by Plaintiff and their counsel, and that after
everything all seemed to he in order and the opposing
parties satisfied, a special meeting was called of the Appellant members after due and proper notice and the
amendments were adopted by at least two-thirds of the
members present, as shown in Exhibit "I" of Plaintiff's
Complaint (R-39, 41). The then State Commander, James
Brussatto, and Woolas A. Macey, together with Plaintiff's
attorney, had approved of these amendents before the special
meeting was called and before Appellant formally approved
and filed the same. This approval was by letter dated September 9, 1957, and is as follows (R-103):
"Pursuant to our telephone conversation this mornning I am writing you requesting that the Veterans
Foundation formally adopt and file the amendments
to its Articles of Incorporation in the manner which
we have previously agreed to. It is our understanding that the Board of Directors of the Veterans Foundation have already agreed to these amendents and
their minutes will show this approval. We now understand that the amendments must be approved by
the members of the Foundation, and that you will
immediately advertise notice of a members meeting
for the purpose of acting on these amendements.
"I have been authorized to state that just as soon as
the amendments are adopted and filed with the Secretary of State's office that the State Department
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officers will submit the amendments to the chapters
throughout the State of Utah and to the National
office for ratification and approval. I have requested the Commander of the State Department and
the Adjutant to sign this letter so that you will know
that they have approved the contents and agreed to
this procedure.
"We also request an early opportunity to discuss with
the Board the naming of Mr. Perry to the holdover
position now occupied by Roy A. Hendrikson.
"We believe that with completion of these steps that
harmony can and will prevail in the operations of the
Veterans Foundation. I am sure that we both realize
that it has taken a good deal of patience to reach this
point in our negotiations, and I sincerely hope that
they can be quickly wound up in harmony. We
would appreciate your acknowledging this letter so
that we might advise other officers and chapter officers throughout the State of the progress that is
being and has been made in these matters.
Sincerely,
I sl Max K. Mangum
I sl James Brusatto
I sl W oolas A. Macey"
That, even after these promises and the changes and
amendments and apparent harmony prevailing, Plaintiff,
through its State Commander, James Brusatto, liefused to
submit to all the chapters or to the national organization
the project for their further approval, and in fact indicated
to the Board of Directors of Appellant corporation on March
22, 1958, that the Plaintiff never would cooperate with Appellant. (See Exhibit "G", Paragraph ( 4) of Plaintiff's
Complaint (R-29), (R-57), also, Plaintiff's Answers to
Defendant's Interrogatories, Numbers 17 (g) and 17 (h)
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(R-88, 89). That Plaintiff continued to receive about
$1,500.00 or more each month from Appellant, but refused
to give cooperation to the project, and in fact continued to
fight Appellant and its officers and directors attempting to
discredit them before the local chapters and the national
organization.
Consequently, on March 27, 1958, Appellant served
notioe upon Plaintiff that the payments to them would be
terminated and that in accordance with the Articles of Incorporation, the money would be paid to the local chapters
of the State of Utah (R-29). Plaintiff, through its State
Commander, James Brusatto, then instituted this law suit
by filing a Complaint and setting forth three causes of action.
The first cause of action asked for judgment restraining and
enjoining Defendants from ceasing the payments and requesting an order that the payments be continued to Plaintiff
pending the final determination of the matter. The second
cause of action prayed for a dissolution of said Appellant
corporation, which cause of action was later abandoned by
Plaintiff. The third cause of action requested an order for
the removal of Appellant officers and directors and for a
special meeting to be held for the nomination and election
of a new Board of Directors of Appellant corporation.
Defendants and Appellant resisted this suit by filing a detailed Answer. Before any pre-trial was had or any hearing
on the merits, Defendants and Appellant filed a motion for
Summary Judgment (R-107). That at the time of the
scheduled hearing on said motion, no evidence was taken,
but an informal discussion was had with the court by the
attorneys for both sides. That at that time counsel for
Plaintiff also made a motion for Summary judgment for
the relief demanded in Plaintiffs Complaint ( R -110). The
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court took the motions under advisement after giving an
opportunity for counsel to submit memorandums, which was
done. Thereafter, the court entered its Order in the case,
over the filed objections to said Order made by counsel for
Defendants and Appellant (R-125). This appeal, therefore, is taken from that part of the lower court's Order that
was against Appellant.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF, AS AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION IS NOT A PROPER PARTY TO BRING SUIT IN
THE UTAH COURTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND
APPELLANT, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
ALLOWING THE SAME.
POINT II
THE ORDER OF THE COURT REQUIRING DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANT TO AMEND AND CHANGE
ARTICLE IV OF APPELLANT'S ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION IS IMPROPER, WITHOUT FOUNDATION,
AND BEYOND THE POWER AND PROVINCE OF
THE COURT.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AN UNCONDITIONAL ORDER ENJOINING DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANT FROM FURTHER WITHHOLDING PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF OF TEN PERCENT OF THE
GROSS VOLUME OF SALES OF THE VETERANS
FOUNDATION, A NON-PROFIT CORPORATION.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF, AS AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION, IS NOT A PROPER PARTY TO BRING SUIT
IN THE UTAH COURTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND
APPELLANT, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
ALLOWING THE SAME.
Plaintiff, as the Department of Utah, Disabled American Veterans, is an unincorporated association, and has no
capacity as such to sue in its own name in the Utah Courts.
Plaintiff has not sued in the name of the fourteen local
chapters of the Disabled American Veterans, some of which
are incorporated, and others of which are not, nor has Plaintiff sued in the name of the National DAV Corporation.
It is true that under Utah law Plaintiff, as a mere association, may he sued in its common name by others. Rule
17 (d) rules of civil procedure of Utah Code Annotated 1953
provides for this as follows:
"(d) ASSOCIATES MAY BE SUED BY COMMON
NAME. When two or more persons associated in
any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a common name, whether it
comprises the name of such associates or not, they
may he sued by such common name; and any judgment obtained against the defendant in such case shall
bind the joint property of all the associates in the
same manner as if all had been named defendants
and had been sued upon their joint liability."
It does not follow, however, that the mere fact that an
association may he sued in its common name allows such
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association to institute an action in its own name. The law
on this point seems quite clear to the contrary. In the notes
under Rule 17 (d) of the 1957 Pocket Supplement we read
the following:

"Associations may not institute actions in own name.
"While law of Utah confers upon an unincorporated
association sufficient status to be sued in its own
name as a party defendant it includes no provision
and no authority permitting such an association to
institute an action in its own name as a party plaintiff. Statutes which authorize suits against an association in its common or associate name do not confer a
mutual or reciprocal privilege permitting such associations to institute litigation in their own name.
American Newspaper Guild v. Mackinnon, 108 F.
Supp. 312."
On Page 313, Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the above cited
case is found what counsel for Appellant believes and contends is the Utah law, and is quoted as follows:
"The general common law rule is that an unincorporated association has no legal entity aside from its
members and has, therefore, no standing and no
capacity as a party litigant in its own name."
"While the law of Utah includes enabling legislation,
which confers upon an unincorporated association
sufficient status to be sued in its own name as a party
defendant, it includes no provision and no authority
permitting such an association to institute an action
in its own name as a party plaintiff. It has been
held repeatedly that statutes which authorize suits
against an association in its common or associate
name, do not confer a mutual or reciprocal privilege
permitting such associations to institute litigation in
their own name."
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Counsel for plaintiff cited in his memorandum before
the lower Court the case of Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees Union, 147 Fed. (2nd) 865 in support of his view.
We shall not in this brief go into an argument on This
District of Columbia Court's ruling and the special nature of
Union organizations, but we feel it should be sufficient to
point out that the Federal Court in the American Newspaper
Guild v. Mackinnon case above cited specifically refused to
hold with the Busby case for the reason that the Court had
to resolve the question according to the law of the forum,
which in this case was the State of Utah. The Court went on
to say:
"If this Court were to adopt and follow the rule of the
Busby case, it would, in effect, usurp the functions
of either the judicial or legislative bodies of the State
of Utah. It would, for purposes of this case, change
the existing law of that State."
In 4 American Jurisprudence, Section 36 at Page 478,
appellant is further supported in its position:
"An association may protect its rights against third
persons by instituting legal proceedings, although in
the absence of statutory authority for bringing suits
in the name of an unincorporated association or
statutory recognition of such bodies as legal entities,
such actions must be brought in the name of all the
members or by some person acting in a representative capacity, and not in the name of the association."
Again, Section 46 of 4 American Juris prudence, Page
485 points up the well established rule as follows:
"It is a well-established rule that in the absence of
enabling or permissive statute, an unincorporated association cannot sue or be sued in the association
name. The reason is, that such an association or
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society, in the absence of statutes recognizing it, has
no legal entity distinct from that of its members." See
also Pearson v. Anderburg, (Utah) 80 P. 307.

It should be noted also that the California Statute,
Section 388 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, is
very similar to our Utah Statute, Rule 17 (d) of The Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1953, above cited, which allows
unincorporated associations to be sued in their own name.
However, this does not give license to such association to
institute suit in its own name as is pointed out in "Case v.
Kadota Fig Association of Producers" (Calif.) 220 p2nd
912, wherein the Court stated:
"In California, persons associated in business under
a common name may be sued under that name (Section 388 of Calif. Code of Civil Procedure). However, this statutory relaxation of the common law
applies only to associated defendants. Associated
plaintiffs still must sue in their individual names."
Again the case of "Juneau Spruce Corporation v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union et al,"
235 p2nd 607 (Calif.) is in support of the law that the
entity theory is rejected except where specifically provided
for by statute, and the fact that the statute allows suit against
an association, "it does not follow that the association may be
regarded as an entity for all other purposes."
Counsel for appellant submits, therefore, that even
though the name of an agent upon whom process or demands
against Disabled American Veterans may be served has
been filed in the office of the Secretary of State in Utah,
this does not give license nor authority to plaintiff, as a
mere association, to sue in its own name under our Utah
Statutes, and we further submit that the lower Court, in view
of this law erred in not dismissing plaintiff's Complaint.
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POINT II
THE ORDER OF THE COURT REQUIRING DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANT TO AMEND AND
CHANGE ARTICLE IV OF APPELLANT'S ARTICLES
OF INCORPORATION IS IMPROPER, WITHOUT
FOUNDATION, AND BEYOND THE POWER AND
PROVINCE OF THE COURT.
The law appears to be quite clear that the courts will
not substitute their judgment for that of corporate officers
and directors nor should the courts interfere with the internal
affairs of a corporation.
In 13 American Jurisprudence, Page 498, Section 452,
we find the following:
"DISPUTES OVER CORPORATE MANAGEMENT AND POLICIES. The majority stockholders
of a corporation have an undisputable right, in the
absence of fraud, to manage the corporate affairs
within the powers possessed by such corporation, and
courts of equity will not, as a general rule, exercise
jurisdiction at the instance of shareholders in a corporation to control or interfere in the management
of the corporate or internal affairs of the corporation.
They have no power to interpose their authority for
the purpose of adjusting controversies that have
arisen among the shareholders or directors of a corporation relative to the proper mode of conducting
the corporate business as they may have in case of
a similar controversy arising between the members
of an ordinary partnership. Mere errors of judgment on the part of the officers or majority stockholders are not sufficient as grounds for the inter·
ference of equity at the instance of minority stockholders. The breach of duty by a corporation,
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authorizing equitable relief by a shareholder, does
not refer to mere mismanagement or neglect of the
officers or directors in the control of corporate affairs
or the abuse of discretion lodged in them in the conduct of the corporation business. The courts do not
interfere on these grounds; to authorize or to justify
interference, there must be actual or threatened in·
jurious acts ultra vires, fraudulent and injurious
practices abuse of power, or oppression on the part
of the corporation or its officers which are clearly
subversive of the rights of the minority or of a stockholder and which, without such suits, would leave
him remediless."
In the case at bar, the members of appellant corporation
are endowed with the same rights and privileges as stockholders in corporations for profit. In the first place, Plaintiff is not even a member of appellant corporation, nor is it
representing the members, but even if Plaintiff were a
member and had capacity to sue (which it does not), then
the courts would not have power to interfere without a show·
ing of fraud or ultra vires acts or injurious practices. In our
case, there was no evidence taken, nor do the pleadings show
any justification for interference by the court. The pleadings do show that there has been a fight between certain
factions in the matter of just where the control of the
appellant corporation should be.
Counsel for Appellant feels that It IS important and
necessary for the court in this matter to know and understand that the question of political control by a few in this
fund raising project with the Disabled American Veterans
of this state is of no small moment. That a careful analysis
of the Constitution of Department of Utah Disabled American Veterans, and particularly Article V will show that the
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supreme power of Plaintiff organization is vested in a state
convention and that the voting power is such that one or two
of the fourteen chapters within the state may control affairs
merely by reason of having large memberships shown on
their books, regardless of who is present at said convention
to consider important matters. Thus, a very few in control
of one or two of the large chapters may in essence control the
entire Plaintiff organization within the state. · For this reason at the time appellant corporation was contemplated in
1955 and 1956, it was determined by the State Executive
Committee, wherein all the chapters were represented in the
state as well as the officers of Plaintiff association, that
Veterans Foundation should be established as a corporation
separate and apart from the usual political control of a few
within the DAV organization, (R-22, 76). Consequently,
the articles of incorporation of Veterans Foundation were
drafted with this specifically in mind and approved by Plaintiff (R-95), and Appellant became a valid, existing corporation under the laws of the state of Utah. Since its incorporation, a few individuals within the DAV of this state have
managed to control the state offices and also to convince the
National DAV Corporation, that the fund raising project in
Utah should not be approved nationally until complete control is placed in the plaintiff organization. This, of course,
would only result in changing officers and directors of
appellant corporation with each change of DAV officers at
the whim of the political leaders, and it was this very thing
that the corporation was designed to prevent. Further, none
of the officers or directors of Appellant receive any material
benefit by serving the corporation, and many hours of work
have been put in without remuneration by the present directors and officers of Appellant. Therefore, there is a greater
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fiduciary duty upon said officers and directors to serve and
handle affairs of the corporation on behalf of all American
veterans who are its members, rather than on behalf of a few
controlling the plaintiff organization.
There is no question but that the money raised by
Appellant belongs to the Veterans and is to be used for and
on their behalf, but the Veterans organizations must either
approve the project and give support to it, or discontinue
taking the money raised, in fairness to Orlo L. Ellison and
the public. The chapters within the state are, after all, the
organizations where the charitable service is primarily performed, and for the Appellant to decide to pay the moneys
to said chapters, all in accordance with its articles of incorporation, after Plaintiff indicated they would never cooperate, (R-29), was only proper, and in keeping with its
fiduciary relation to all its members. Thousands of dollars
have gone to Plaintiff from Appellant and a great amount
of this has been used for the sole purpose of fighting appellant
and its officers and directors, and in the past Plaintiff has
been requested to make an accounting as to what the money
has been used for, but Plaintiff has refused to so account,
(R-80, 85). Now it has been Appellant's contention that
the majority of the DAV members, who make up the chapters as well as appellant corporation, have approved or
would readily approve the fund raising project and appellant
corporation if given a proper opportunity to do so. The
corporation and project was originally approved in this state,
as has been pointed out in this brief, but after recommendations for changes in the articles of incorporation were made
by the national organization and those changes made and
approved by Plaintiff, and the appellant corporate members
(R-39, 103), the further approval was not requested of all
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the chapters or of the national organization. Plaintiff has
refused to do so in violation of their promises and moral
obligations. In spite of this, however, it does not mean that
Appellant is not a validly operating Utah corporation, and
for the lower court to arbitrarily step in and make a mandatory order that Appellant change its articles of incorporation
without hearing any evidence, and without even being pleaded
by Plaintiff, is wrong, beyond the power and jurisdiction of
the court, and would certainly work an injustice upon the
Appellant corporate members who have approved said
articles.
In the case of Wall v. Board of Regents of the University of California, 102 P. 2nd 533, the court said:
"In absence of fraudulent conduct on part of those
who have been lawfully entrusted with management
and conduct of the corporations affairs, a court has
no power or right to intermeddle with internal affairs
of a corporation, and authority of a corporation's
directors in conduct of corporation's business must be
regarded as absolute when directors act within the
law, and a court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the directors."
See also in support of this position the following cita124 ALR 359; Briggs v. Scripps, 56 P 2nd 277;
tions:
Campbell v. Clark, 324 P 2nd 51.
It is Appellant's further contention that the proper
way to work out the problems of control and other internal
corporate matters is through the lawful avenues provided in
Appellant's articles of incorporation and through other remedies provided within the DAV Organization. In the constitution of plaintiff association, Article II, Section 3, it states:
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"Each chapter agrees for itself and its members that
it will not bring any action or proceeding in any court
of law or equity against this Department or any chapter or member thereof or against the National Department or its officers or any officer of this
Department until all remedies provided by this constitution and by National Constitution, By-laws and
lawful mandates have been fully exhausted."
Plaintiff filed its law suit against DAV members and
Appellant immediately after receiving notice from Appellant that the funds normally paid it were going to be
terminated and paid to the chapters instead. Plaintiff made
no attempt to call a meeting of DAV members, Appellant
directors or members, or to exhaust other remedies available.
The lower court, therefore, should not have interfered in this
case without making a full determination of whether all
remedies available had been exhausted.
The law is clear on this point. In 13 American Jurisprudence, page 500, Section 454 it states:

"If injury results to a shareholder in a corporation by
an abuse of corporate power, the wrong must be
redressed within the corporation if possible. A stockholder cannot maintain suit against the corporation to
redress a corporate wrong until he has done all in
his power to obtain within such corporation redress
for the wrong complained of."
Counsel for appellant contends that even assuming
plaintiff's having capacity to sue, that insmuch as plaintiff
is not a member of appellant corporation nor sueing on
behalf of said members, nor sueing its officers and directors
on behalf of the corporation, plaintiff still would not be a
proper party to maintain this action and the lower Court
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should have dismissed plaintiff's Complaint and taken no
part in the matter. See 13 American Jurisprudence Page
968, Section 1015.
Counsel for appellant can find no precedence in the
law to justify the lower Court's action in ordering a change
of appellant Articles of Incorporation. These Articles of
Incorporation are provided for by statute, and amendments
or changes to validly organized and existing corporations
mnst of necessity take place in accordance with the provi8ions of said articles and by statute (see 16-2-45 of Utah
Code Annotated, 1953). Otherwise disorder would prevail. The Articles of Incorporation of appellant corporation, article IX of Amendments, provide that "at least twothirds of the members present at any annual meeting, or at
a special meeting called for the purpose, shall approve the
the amendment", (R-37). Now we submit that the ruling
of the lower Court ordering the amendment to article IV
presents a dilemma. Should the officers and directors of
appellant fail to make the required amendment they are
subject to the contempt of the Court, and if the members of
appellant corporation, who must concur in the amendment
refuse to so concur, then shall the members as well as the
officers and directors be subject to contempt proceedings?
How can the Court substitute its judgment for that of the
corporate members?
Article IV of Appellant's Articles of Incorporation has
been approved not only by appellant's members but by
plaintiff as well, (R-39, 40, 103), and what's more, plaintiff
neither pleaded nor prayed for such ruling of the Court.
(See Miller v. Johnson (Utah) 134 U. 1017, Also 41 American Jurisprudence 555).
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We therefore strongly contend that in view of these
circumstances, the mandatory order of the Court is entirely
improper, without foundation in the law, and certainly
beyond the power and jurisdiction of the Court.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AN UNCONDITIONAL ORDER ENJOINING DEFENDANTS AND
APPELLANT FROM FURTHER WITHHOLDING PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF OF TEN PERCENT OF THE
GROSS VOLUME OF SALES OF THE VETERANS
FOUNDATION, A NON-PROFIT CORPORATION.
In order to obtain injunctive relief in a Court of
Equity, there must be no adequate remedy at law, such
relief must be necessary to attain justice and other remedies
and procedures exhausted, a showing of irreparable damage
or injury, coming into court with clean hands, and other
equitable principles satisfied. Further, the Court should
cautiously proceed in the matter. In "Kelly v. Kelly Springfield Tire Co.", 152 Atl. 166, the court states:
"There is no power, exercise of which is more delicate, or which requires greater caution, deliberation
and sound discretion, and which is more dangerous in
a doubtful case, than that to enjoin corporate officers
and agents from exercise of privileges and franchises
of a corporation."
If ever there was a doubtful case, it is the one at bar,
and for the Court to interfere by injunctive orders is to merely
play into the hands of a few political DAV leaders seeking
complete control of Appellant Corporation. Again, in the
case of "Willis v. Lauridson", 118 P. 530, the court cautions:
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"To issue an injunction is the exercise of a delicate
power, requiring great caution and sound discretion
and rarely, if ever, should be exercised in a doubtful
case."
Counsel for appellant contends that plaintiff had not
exhausted its remedies as heretofore mentioned, that plaintiff, further, had a remedy at law in Quo Warranto Proceedings if it felt there was some foundation for the
allegations made, that there was never any showing of irreparable injury or damage, and whether plaintiff came into
court with clean hands is at least questionable in view of
the facts and pleadings set out in this case. In addition
plaintiff was not a proper party to ask for injunctive relief.
(See 28 American Jurisprudence, Page 350, Section 159).
From Fletcher Cyclopedia on Corporations, Vol. 10,
Page 297, the following is quoted:
"Courts will enjoin the acts of the properly constituted
management at the instance of a stockholder, only
where the mangement abuses its powers and acts illegally or fraudulently to the irreparable injury of
complaining stockholders and with resultant impairement or destruction of the corporate franchises, business, or assets."
Appellant officers and directors acted only within the
scope of their Articles, and then not to impair or destroy the
corporate business and assets, but to preserve them. From
the same text above cited, Fletcher continues:
"So long as the Directors or officers act within their
legal powers and not fraudulently, injunction will not
issue to control the discretion lodged in them in re-
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spect to the internal affairs and conduct of the corporation." See also, Skeen v. Warren Irrigation Co.
(Utah) 132 P. 1162; 28 American Jurisprudence

277)
Further, that to unconditionally order that defendants
and appellant be enjoined from further withholding payments to the plaintiff of 10% of the gross volume of sales
of the Veterans Foundation, raises a serious question as
to the carrying out of the further powers of said corporation
under Article four of its Articles of Incorpation now on
file, and specifically paragraph B under what is denoted,
"General Powers". That the next to last sentence under the
general powers clause of Article 4(b) reads as follows:

"It shall also have the power to make such expenditures, to take such steps as the Board of Directors
may deem necessary to carry out the ultimate objectives of the corporation, as will tend to build its
prestige before the public, including among other
things, the requirement from time to time of detailed
reports of said State Department or chapters of the
Disabled Veterans, as the case may be, showing what
the money received by them from this corporation
was used for, with the power to withhold further
payments to them if the money has been unjudiciously
spent and has not been used to substantially carry
out the objects of the corporation as set out in paragraph A of this Article."
That Veterans Foundation, a non-profit corporation, has
heretofore requested a report from the State Department in
connection with the use of the moneys but has been refused,
and surely there ought to be some checks on the use of these
funds raised through the public.
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We contend, therefore, that a case for injunctive relief
was not made out by plaintiff, and that the court was in error
to unconditionally enjoin any further withholding of payments to plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the orders and
rulings of the lower Court enjoining appellant and requiring said corporation, its officers and directors to change its
Articles of Incorporation, be modified and reversed. That
the plaintiff is not a proper party to this law suit, and that
the lower Court's decision in allowing the same should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
CHILD, SPAFFORD & YOUNG
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

